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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 890336-CA 
v. : 
THOMAS D. MONTES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary, a 
third degree felony, and theft, a second degree felony, after a 
jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether defense counsel acted competently in not 
objecting to portions of the testimony of Monica Lawson at trial? 
An appellate court must review the reasonableness of counsel's 
conduct in view of all circumstances and must entertain a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonably part of trial 
strategy and tactics. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689-90 (1984). 
2. Whether defense counsel acted effectively in not 
objecting to the testimony of Tom Jones at trial? An appellate 
court must review the reasonableness of counsel's conduct in view 
of all circumstances and must entertain a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct was reasonably part of trial strategy and 
tactics. Strickland v, Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984). 
3. Whether the State's cross-examination of Davey 
Montes was reasonably within the scope of his direct examination, 
thus justifying defense counsel's decision not to object to the 
cross-examination? An appellate court must review the 
reasonableness of counsel's conduct in view of all circumstances 
and must entertain a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
was reasonably part of trial strategy and tactics. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984). 
4. Whether defense counsel acted competently in not 
objecting to the rebuttal testimony of Jeanna Hackford and in not 
requesting a limiting instruction for her testimony? An 
appellate court must review the reasonableness of counsel's 
conduct in view of all circumstances and must entertain a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonably part of trial 
strategy and tactics. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689-90 (1984). 
5. Whether the trial court committed plain error for 
failing to require sua sponte a limiting instruction regarding 
Ms. Hackford's testimony? To find plain error, an appellate 
court's examination of the record must reveal that the error 
should have been both obvious to the trial court and prejudicial 
to the defendant. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 
121 (Utah 1989). 
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6. Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not 
informing the court of alleged conversations between jury members 
during the trial? Where the record is incomplete, an appellate 
court must presume the correctness of the judgment below. 
Sampson v. Richinsf 770 P.2d 998# 1003 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 776 P.2d 916 (1989). 
7. Whether defense counsel was ineffective for not 
informing the court that the defendant was seen by jurors in 
handcuffs outside the courtroom during the trial? Where the 
record is incomplete, an appellate court must presume the 
correctness of the judgment below. Sampson v. Richins# 770 P.2d 
998, 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid 801(d)(l)t 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The 
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the 
witness denies having made the statement or 
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his 
testimony and is offered to rebut an express 
or implied charge against him of recent 
fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made 
after perceiving him; or 
Utah R. Evid. 105s 
When evidence which is admissible as to 
one party or for one purpose but not 
admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with burglary, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) and 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-404 (1990). Defendant was found guilty after a jury trial 
on February 24, 1989 in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, Judge, presiding (R. 102-03, 262). 
Judge Draney sentenced defendant to serve a term of zero to five 
(0-5) years for the burglary conviction and one to fifteen (1-15) 
years for the theft conviction (R. 44-45, 268). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of November 15, 1987, someone broke into 
Sather's Jewelry Store in Roosevelt, Utah and absconded with gold 
rings, watches, and pendants (R. 136-37, 157-59). Robert Sather, 
the owner of the store, estimated the value of the stolen 
property at $15,000 to $35,000 (R. 160). Sather testified that 
he had given nobody permission to possess or distribute the 
stolen merchandise (R. 162). 
Earlier the same evening, defendant, Lyle Hendrix, 
Monica Lawson, and Torlinna Lawson had been driving around the 
Roosevelt area in a blue Suzuki Samurai stopping at several 
convenience stores (R. 167-168, 171). Finally, the Samurai 
stopped in front of Sather's Jewelry Store (R. 168). Defendant 
and Hendrix got out of the vehicle and peaked in the window (R. 
168-69, 170). When defendant and Hendrix returned to the car, 
one of them said, "It's too easy. A piece of cake." (R. 170, 
177). They also discussed a "payoff" (R. 170). 
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At approximately 10:00 p.m., a passing motorist, Tom 
Jones, noticed two people looking in the window of Sather's with 
a blue Samurai parked nearby (R. 182, 183). He had previously 
noticed the same vehicle at several Roosevelt convenience stores 
(R. 181). While Jones could not identify the men in the vehicle, 
he did recognize Monica Lawson (R. 183, 187). 
At about 10:30 p.m., defendant took Monica and Torlinna 
Lawson home (R. 168). Fifteen minutes later, defendant and 
Hendrix arrived at an apartment belonging to Angela Conger and 
Clint Perank (R. 189, 191). Defendant and Hendrix left and came 
back approximately fifteen minutes later with jewelry in bags and 
trays (R. 189-90). Defendant and Hendrix sorted the jewelry into 
paper bags and then left when Conger insisted they do so (R. 190, 
193, 195) The two returned a few minutes later with some more 
jewelry, but soon left for the final time (R. 190). Conger's 
apartment was less than half a block from Sather's Jewelry Store 
(R. 193). 
The next day, Monica Lawson saw Davey Montes, 
defendant's brother, at Union High School (R. 172). Monica, 
having heard of the burglary and being aware of defendant's 
actions the previous evening, asked Davey if defendant and 
Hendrix had burglarized the store. Ld. Davey answered in the 
affirmative and showed Monica some rings that defendant and 
Hendrix had given him. Id. 
At trial, defendant presented an alibi defense. 
Hendrix testified that he had given defendant a ride to Roosevelt 
so that defendant could see his parole officer (R. 205). Hendrix 
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affirmed Monica's testimony that he, defendant, Monica, and 
Torlinna Lawson went out driving (R. 206). He denied discussing 
Sather's Jewelry Store with either girl or being in the vicinity 
of the store with them (R. 207). He also denied defendant was 
involved in the burglary (R. 207, 211). According to Hendrix, 
after dropping the Lawson girls off at their home, he took 
defendant to the home of defendant's parents (R. 208). Hendrix 
said he went to Clint Perank's house by himself (R. 208-09). He 
also testified that he, defendant and two girls travelled to 
Ogden later that evening (R. 209-12, 224). 
Defendant's father, David Montes, testified that he had 
returned home from a bowling tournament between 10:30 and 11:00 
p.m. that evening and that defendant was present when he arrived 
(R. 216). He further testified that Hendrix, defendant, and two 
girls left around 3:00 a.m. Id. 
Davey Montes corroborated the testimony of his father 
that defendant arrived at the Montes home at approximately 10:30 
p.m. (R. 220). According to Davey, Hendrix left without 
defendant after dropping defendant off. J^ L Davey said 
defendant, Hendrix, and their traveling companions left between 
2:00 and 3:00 a.m. JW. On cross-examination, the State asked 
Davey if he had seen Monica at school the next day (R. 222). 
While Davey remembered the conversation with Monica, he denied 
possessing any rings or other jewelry and denied telling Monica 
that his brother was involved in the burglary. Id. 
In rebuttal, the State called Jeanna Hackford, Davey's 
former girlfriend (R. 227). Jeanna testified that Davey told her 
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that his brother "and some other guy" were involved in the 
burglary (R. 228). 
Defendant's sister, Stephanie, testified consistently 
with her father and her brother that defendant was in the Montes 
home at 11:00 p.m. (R. 225). She also testified that they left 
between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. (R. 225-26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to 
succeed, the defendant must show both that the performance by 
counsel was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by 
the conduct. 
In the present case, overwhelming evidence supports 
defendant's guilt. Monica Lawson placed defendant outside of the 
jewelry store and conferring with a confederate in language from 
which a reasonable jury could infer an intent to break into the 
store. Angela Conger observed defendant's possession of jewelry 
and rings shortly afterward. The jury apparently believed the 
State's witnesses and disbelieved defendant's alibi witnesses. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, and in view of the 
overwhelming evidence against defendant, there is no reasonable 
probability of a different result in the absence of the claimed 
ineffective assistance of defense counsel. 
In any event, defendant's claims of ineffective counsel 
are individually meritless. Monica's testimony about her 
conversation with defendant's brother the day after the robbery 
was properly admitted and an objection by defense counsel would 
have been pointless. Even though the statements were hearsay, 
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the confrontation rights of defendant were not thwarted since the 
statements were made by defendant's brother who testified as a 
defense witness. Monica's testimony was directly relevant to the 
issue of defendant's guilt. Defendant does not establish that a 
Rule 403 objection for undue prejudice would succeed since a 
trial judge has wide discretion in applying the 
probative/prejudice balancing test. 
Tom Jones's testimony was relevant since he 
corroborated a portion of Monica's testimony. Jones recalled 
seeing a blue Suzuki Samari parked in front of the jewelry store 
on the night of the burglary, observed two of its passengers 
peering into the window of the jewelry store, and recognized 
Monica as one of the passengers. Since his testimony 
corroborated Monica's testimony, it was properly admitted at 
trial. The prosecutor laid adequate foundation for Jones to 
testify. 
The State properly cross-examined Davey Montes. The 
questions asked went directly to Davey's credibility, a critical 
issue for the jury to evaluate given the nature of defendant's 
alibi defense. 
The State also properly called Jeanna Hackford as a 
rebuttal witness regarding Davey's testimony. Because Jeanna's 
testimony was substantive non-hearsay evidence under Utah R. 
Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), it was not ineffective for defense counsel to 
fail to request a Utah R. Evid. 105 limiting instruction. 
Nor did the trial court commit plain error in not 
giving a limiting instruction sua sponte where Jeanna's testimony 
was admitted as substantive evidence. 
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Defendant's final two allegations of error should not 
be considered because his claims are not supported by the record, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR 
FAILING TO OBJECT TO MONICA LAWSON'S 
TESTIMONY. 
Defendant claims that he was afforded ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to the alleged incompetent actions of 
his defense attorney, Roland Uresk. All of defendant's claims 
lack merit and should be summarily rejected. However, each claim 
will be addressed in turn. 
As cited by defendant, the accepted standard for a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to 
prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant "must show, 
first that his or her counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989) (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
While this Court has overturned convictions for 
ineffective assistance of counsel only twice, the Utah Supreme 
Court has never overturned a conviction for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). In both Moritzsky and Crestani, special circumstances 
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existed. In Moritzsky, the defense attorney was unaware of a 
recent change in the law and, consequently, did not ask for a 
legitimate jury instruction which could have changed the outcome 
of the trial. Moritzskyf 771 P.2d at 692-93. In Crestani# the 
defense attorney, a former Utah Attorney General, did not prepare 
adequately for trial by properly investigating his client's case. 
This Court held that if a proper investigation had been 
conducted, the outcome of the trial might have been different. 
Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1091-92. 
In State v. Lairbyf 699 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Strickland standard as consistent with 
its previous holdings regarding effective assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 1203 (citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 
1983)). According to Lairby, the burden of proof lies with the 
defendant and counsel's ineffectiveness must be a demonstrable 
reality, not a speculative matter. Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1203. 
Trial strategy or tactics do not rise to the level of 
ineffectiveness of counsel simply because they did not produce 
the anticipated result. Ici. The deficiency in performance must 
be prejudicial. Id. See Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1109; State v. 
McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). To be prejudicial, 
there must be a "reasonable probability" that the outcome would 
be different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This Court has 
defined reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1089 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 494). Mere speculation that an 
outcome may have been different is not sufficient. State v. 
Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Utah 1987). 
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Legitimate choices of tactics or strategy by an 
attorney will not normally fall beneath the standard of 
reasonableness. State v. Bullockf 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 36 
(Utah 1989), petition for cert, filed, (Feb. 20, 1990).; State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 191 (Utah 1988). See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689. "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation 
of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 
unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. See Crestani, 
771 P.2d at 1090. Such "[d]ecisions as to . . . what objections 
to make . . . are generally left to the professional judgment of 
counsel." State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). In 
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court said, ,f[t]his Court will not second guess the strategy of 
counsel at trial." Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 59. 
Similarly, other jurisdictions have also concluded that 
trial tactics or strategy should be given wide latitude. The 
Colorado Supreme Court stated that the "public defender's 
decision not to object to what the defendant characterizes as 
prejudicial and irrelevant evidence falls within the reach of 
trial strategy." People v. Bossert, 722 P.2ds 998, 1010 (Colo. 
1986). 
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a dim view of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based solely on the lack 
of an objection by defense counsel at trial without a showing of 
resulting prejudice. State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 159 
(Utah 1989). The Court explained that to allow ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims without a showing of prejudice would 
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encourage defendants to manipulate the system by not objecting at 
trial, then claiming ineffectiveness of counsel on appeal• Id. 
See Strickland, 484 U.S. at 693. 
In the present case, defendant fails on both prongs of 
the Strickland test. He fails to demonstrate a reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different but for 
counsel's allegedly deficient performance. The evidence of 
defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Based solely on evidence 
about which defendant does not complain, a jury could reasonably 
convict defendant of the jewelry store burglary and theft. 
Defendant and Lyle Hendrix were seen looking into the window of 
Sather's Jewelry Store with one of them saying, "It's a piece of 
cake1' (R. 170). Defendant and Lyle Hendrix arrived at Angela 
Conger's apartment on the evening of the burglary bearing trays 
full of rings and other jewelry (R. 189-90). Since there is no 
reasonable probability the outcome would have been different 
absent the alleged errors, defendant fails to satisfy the second 
prong of Strickland. This alone defeats his ineffectiveness 
claim. See Archuleta, 747 P.2d at 1023. In any event, 
defendant's claims of deficient performance will be examined 
individually. 
Defendant complains that Monica Lawson should not have, 
been allowed to testify that she had seen defendant's brother, 
Davey Montes, at high school the day after the robbery. She 
testified that she asked him if his brother committed the robbery 
of Sather's Jewelry Store (R. 172). Davey Montes said yes and 
showed her some rings which Hendrix and his brother had given 
him. Id. 
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Defendant claims that the testimony was improper for 
three separate reasons. First, defendant claims that the 
statement was inadmissible hearsay. Second, defendant claims the 
testimony was irrelevant. Finally, defendant claims that the 
testimony was more prejudicial than probative. None of these 
contentions has any merit. 
A. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT IMPERMISSIBLE HEARSAY. 
Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). The well-recognized purpose of the hearsay 
rule is to secure to the accused the sixth amendment right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. See U.S. 
Const, amend. VI; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 
(1970). Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that 
hearsay "is not admissible except as provided by law or by these 
rules" (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has 
ruled that it is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause to 
admit a declarant's out-of-court statements as long as he is 
testifying as a witness at trial and is subject to cross-
examination. Green, 399 U.S. at 162. Merely because evidence is 
admitted in violation of the hearsay rule does not mean that 
confrontation rights have been violated. Id. at 156. The Utah 
Supreme Court has similarly recognized that a defendant's 
confrontation rights are not violated by the admission of out-of-
court statements of a witness subject to cross-examination 
regarding those statements. State v. Marcumf 750 P.2d 599, 603 
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(Utah 1988); State v. Loughton, 747 P.2d 426, 429 (Utah 1987); 
State v, Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1218-19 (Utah 1987), cert, denied 
484 U.S. 1044 (1988); State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 
1986). 
In the present case, defendant is objecting because of 
the out-of-court statements of one of his own witnesses. Davey 
Montes was called as a defense witness at trial (R. 218). 
Counsel could have asked Davey about this statement on direct 
examination, but chose not to do so. On cross-examination, the 
prosecution did ask Davey about whether he had told Monica that 
his brother had committed the robbery (R. 222-23). Davey denied 
having done so (R. 223). See infra Point III of this Brief. 
Since Davey was available to testify and actually did 
testify for the defense, Monica's testimony concerning their 
conversation the day after the robbery, though technically 
hearsay, was admissible under the case law cited above. 
B. THE TESTIMONY WAS RELEVANT. 
Defendant also claims that Davey's statement to Monica 
was irrelevant. To the contrary, it was quite relevant. 
Irrelevant evidence has been defined as "that which has no legal 
tendency to establish any material proposition. Thus the 
appropriate test of the relevancy of such evidence is whether the 
proffered evidence would render the desired inference more 
probable then [sic] it would be without such evidence." State v. 
Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Utah 1980). See also State v. Gray, 
717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
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The statements made by Davey to Monica directly went to 
the elements of the crime of theft. A person commits theft if 
"he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property 
of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990). By giving his brother some of the 
jewelry from Sather's Jewelry Store, it could be reasonably 
inferred that defendant intended to deprive Sather's Jewelry 
Store of its property and that defendant came into possession of 
the property illegally. Thus, the testimony was relevant. 
C. THE EVIDENCE WAS MORE PROBATIVE THAN PREJUDICIAL. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that 
evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of "unfair prejudice." 
Defendant contends that the probative value of Monica's testimony 
about Davey's statements is less than its prejudicial effect that 
had defense counsel objected, the trial court would have been 
obliged to exclude it and that the trial court would have erred 
had it been admitted. Within the context of Rule 403, "unfair 
prejudice" requires that the disputed evidence have more than 
mere detrimental effect on defendant's case; it must have an 
"undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one." United 
States v. Grassi# 602 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 
448 U.S. 902, aff'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 444, cert, denied, 
450 U.S. 956 (1981) (citations omitted). 
Defendant makes a conclusory statement that he was 
prejudiced by Monica's testimony. Mere prejudice does not make 
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evidence inadmissible. Testimony which goes to defendant's guilt 
by its nature is prejudicial• The operative term is "unfair." 
Noticeably, defendant does not articulate how the testimony was 
"unfair." Davey's statements the day after the break-in go 
directly to an inference that defendant came into possession of 
the property illegally and were not "unfairly" prejudicial. 
Even if defense counsel had objected on Rule 403 
grounds, the trial court would have had wide discretion in 
determining whether the statement was admissible or inadmissible. 
See State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352-53 (Utah 1977), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 882 (1978). Other than his conclusory 
statement, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court 
would have found his statement more prejudicial than probative 
had an objection been lodged. Nor has defendant shown that the 
prejudicial effect of the testimony would rise above the level of 
"harmless error." See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 
1986) (decided under Rule 45, which was superseded by Rule 403). 
POINT II 
TOM JONES'S TESTIMONY WAS ADMISSIBLE. 
Defendant next complains that the entire testimony of 
Tom Jones should have been excluded at trial and the failure of 
defense counsel to object to Jones' testimony was ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Defendant claims that inadequate 
foundation was laid for Jones's testimony. The claim has no merit. 
It should be noted that defendant cites no case law to support 
his theory that Jones's testimony was improper. See State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1988) (court may decline to 
rule on argument unsupported by legal analysis or authority). 
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Defendant argues that because Jones could not 
individually recognize defendant when he saw a blue Samarai 
outside of Sather's Jewelry Store and saw two men peering into 
the store, his testimony should be excluded. Defendant misstates 
the record when he claims that "Mr. Jones could only identify one 
of the occupants of the car as a tall guy with a scar over his 
eye." (Brief of App. at 9). Jones testified that he recognized 
the Samurai outside of Sather's as being the same one he had seen 
earlier in the evening (R. 182). More importantly, Jones 
testified that earlier in the evening he recognized one of the 
passengers as Monica Lawson (R. 187). 
Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, requires personal 
knowledge in order for a witness to be competent to testify. 
Evidence to prove personal knowledge can come from the witness's 
own testimony. 
At trial, the State laid sufficient foundation to 
reflect Jones's knowledge that he recognized the vehicle in front 
of Sather's as the same vehicle he had noticed earlier in the 
evening. Jones testified that he noticed a blue Samurai parked 
in front of a Circle K convenience store (R. 180). He said he 
noticed it because it was parked in an unusual manner in front of 
the store. Id. Jones identified the same Samurai in front of 
another convenience store later in the evening (R. 181). Jones 
said he remembered the encounter because the occupants of the 
Samurai were staring at him. Id. He also remembered seeing two 
males and two females in the vehicle. .Id. After noticing the 
Samurai at least twice, and recognizing one of the passengers, 
-17-
Jones saw the same vehicle parked in front of Sather's Jewelry 
Store with two men looking in the window. (R. 182). 
Therefore, adequate foundation was laid for Jones to 
testify about what he observed—testimony which directly 
corroborated Monica's testimony given just minutes before. 
POINT III 
THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DAVEY MONTES 
WAS NOT IMPROPER. 
Defendant claims that defense counsel should have 
objected to questions posed by the State during its cross-
examination of Davey Montes. Specifically, defendant claims the 
State asked questions which were beyond the scope of the direct 
examination and lacked proper foundation. Defendant's claim is 
frivolous. 
First, it should be noted once again that defendant 
cites no case law to support his contention that the State's 
cross-examination was improper. See Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344. 
He merely concludes, without authority, that because defense 
counsel did not ask Davey Montes what he did the next day, the 
prosecution should have been precluded from inquiring about that 
on cross-examination. 
Defendant's claim involves a misreading of Rule 611(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, which states: "Cross-examination should 
be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and 
matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, 
in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional 
matters as if on direct examination." See also State v. Jarrell, 
608 P.2d 218, 228 (Utah 1980). 
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The State's entire cross-examination of Davey Montes 
consists of the following colloquy: 
Q. Davey, do you remember what you were 
doing on the 25th of November of 1987? 
A. No. I don't. 
Q. How about the 2nd of November, 1987? 
A. November we went sleigh riding. 
Q. Do you remember which day? 
A. No. I can't quite remember. 
Q. What sticks the date of the 15th and 16th 
in your head? 
A. Well, this that's happened. 
Q. Okay. Now, when did you find out what 
happened? 
A. When I got subpoenaed to come to court. 
Q. Didn't you know that night that something 
had happened? 
A. No. I didn't. 
Q. Did you ever tell anybody that you did? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you see Monica Lawson the next 
morning at school? 
A. Yes. 
Q. About 9 o'clock? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you have some rings, crossing hearts, 
and things? 
A. No. 
Q. Did she say she had heard of a burglary 
and ask if Tom was involved, and you said 
yes? 
-19-
A. No. She asked me if he was involved and 
I said, "I don't know." I don't know 
what she is talking about, either, if I 
had any rings. But I would not get 
involved with something like that, even 
if it did happen, which I don't know 
about. I didn't know about it then. She 
was asking me questions. 
Q. And you had rings with you, didn't you? 
A. No. 
Q. And you told her Tom Montes was involved, 
didn't you? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you talk to a girl named Jeanna 
Hackford about this? 
A. She asked me about it. 
Q. Did you tell her Tom and Lyle did it? 
A. No. 
(R. 222-23). 
Clearly, the State's cross-examination was proper under 
Rule 611(b) as a matter relating to Davey's veracity. Davey's 
denial was directly contradicted by Monica's previous testimony. 
Further, the trial court had discretion to permit the State to 
proceed into additional matters as if on direct examination. Had 
defense counsel objected, the trial court could have properly 
overruled the objection. 
As to defendant's claim that the cross-examination 
lacked foundation, the State's cross-examination merely expanded 
on the foundation laid by defense counsel during direct 
examination. 
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POINT IV 
THE REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JEANNA HACKFORD WAS 
ADMISSIBLE. 
Defendant next alleges that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because defense counsel should have 
objected to Jeanna Hackford's rebuttal testimony at trial as 
prejudicial or, in the alternative, requested a limiting 
instruction on the scope of her testimony. As with his other 
claims, this claim must also fail. 
After Davey Montes testified, the State called Jeanna 
Hackford as a rebuttal witness. Jeanna testified that Davey had 
confided to her that he was worried about being in trouble 
because of the break-in at Sather's Jewelry Store (R. 228). He 
told her that his brother and "some other guy" were involved. 
Id. Davey had previously denied the statements (R. 223). 
The State agrees with defendant's contention in his 
brief that Jeanna's statements were impeachment testimony and not 
hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of Evidence. (See 
Brief of App. at pp. 10-11). However, the State disagrees that 
the statements had limited admissibility under Rule 105, Utah 
2 
Rules of Evidence. The committee notes to Rule 801 explain that 
the Utah rule "deviates from the federal rule in that it allows 
use of prior statements as substantive evidence if (1) 
2 
Rule 105 states as follows: 
When evidence which is admissible as to 
one party or for one purpose but not 
admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, 
shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
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inconsistent . . . .M The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ramsey, 
782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989)f acknowledged that under Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent statements are admissible as 
substantive evidence. Therefore, the statement was not limited 
in purpose under Rule 105 and no limiting instruction was 
required even if requested. 
Defendant also claims that the potential prejudice of 
Jeanna's testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. 
Again, defendant fails to specify how the testimony was "unfairly 
prejudicial." In that ff[t]he burden of showing error is on the 
party who seeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 
1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), the State should not be put to the task 
of developing defendant's legal arguments by searching through 
the record for possible factual support. Thus, this Court should 
not consider defendant's general claim of error in the absence of 
specific allegations. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
NOT GIVING A LIMITED INSTRUCTION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain 
error in not issuing a cautionary instruction based on Jeanna 
Hackford's testimony. This claim also fails. 
In order for a claim of plain error to succeed, 
defendant must show both that from the appellate court's 
examination of the record that it was obvious to a trial court 
that it was committing error and that the error affected the 
substantial rights of the accused. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); State v. 
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Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989); State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 
186, 189 (Utah 1988) • 
As discussed in Point IV, supra, defendant was not 
entitled to a Rule 105 limiting instruction even if one had been 
requested. Thus, no plain error occurred by the trial court's 
failure to sua sponte include an unnecessary limiting 
instruction. 
POINT VI 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIMS BASED ON MATTERS OUTSIDE THE APPELLATE 
RECORD. 
Defendant claims that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because counsel did not alert the court 
that certain jurors had discussed the case during a recess in the 
trial (Point VI) and that jurors saw defendant in handcuffs 
during a recess (Point VII). Because defendant's claim is not 
supported by the record on appeal, this Court should not consider 
defendant's claims. State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 
1984) (Court cannot rule on matters outside the trial court 
record). 
Defendant relies upon affidavits from himself and his 
sister to support his contentions on appeal. These affidavits 
are not part of the record. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ y ^ d a y of June, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN "/?" J&f .
Assistant Attorney General 
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he bp allowed to withdraw. Respondent believes that the brief 
filed by appellant's counsel is in substantial compliance wit:. 
the requirements of State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981 > 
Under these circumstances, it would be futile to respond to a 
brief of this nature when the only assistance we could lei,..; *r* 
Court would be to repeat the statements of the appellant's 
attorney and perhaps illuminate the broad area of 1PT* c\ir^ 
the issue raised ;~ V - case. 
Respondent requests * ! • •_ 
a formal response in i \&\. oi 1 i 1 Lng 
dismiss the appeal on its merits or 
California. If the Court desires a 
wi 3 1 g 1 a d 1 y c oir.p 1 y u p : r eq u e s t. 
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l 
r r - ^-: ~ -•! ATnpa 1 s S e n i -
IMLibks 
STA IT: OF I I'AI i 
^ - • : o - 5 > court 
a brief and either pi J 
in harmony with Anders v. 
further resr^r^t' '-v;r *: ^e 
cc: Joel D. Berrett 
THK ATTORNKY GKNKR M 
fi***f~0^ 
% . i 8 9 6 ,>' 
~*~000**'9 
STA I"F Ol ' 1 i/AH 
JL I'AL'L VAN D A M - A U O K M V C iiM 
2 3 6 STAT'F C A I T l ' O l • SA1 I h M l l H t" I AH n 4 S 14 • I I I K P M O N h KOI 5.18 10 IS • FAX N<) 
December 6, 198 9 
JOs i 14 i * , i " i i 
C't 1IEF l>K*s T> A T n i k s n I , [ S : K M 
Fl 
Mary T. Noonan 
Cleirk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeal 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 Eas: 
Salt Lake Cit\ 
Charier,*'i , 
K
-• State v, Thomas P. Montes, Case 890336-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
T::> , ^ . . r- r , *i. A*X above entitled case-
harmony with Aiders ^ ''* 36' L\ f*. 7?8 (1967), has 
ptated, in the Brief -*>«* .- his opinion that 
\i\e issues raise i ire not sound and has requested tn:;: 
:•*? be allowed tc * Respondent believes that the brief 
* .led by appellant's counsel is in substantial compliance wit" 
..*.- requirements of State v. Clayton,, 639 P. 2d 16P^ "Jtah ;9BI 
;vier these circumstances, it would be futile to r- -•;.• >nd to a 
] ef of this nature wher, th» : ly assistance we c-:.,lJ lend the 
^jurt would be to repeat th * it^r-nts ot the appellant's 
attorney and perhaps illumi^*4 /_ ", l> *-•» -1 ->*"•*-> ~* ^ 
the issue raised : i. t'- ;;ar-: 
surround .- ig 
Respondent requests Lne L-^ .. , n^t^t Liiis letter as 
a formal response . r. Ilea of filing a brief and either proceed to 
dismiss the appeal on its merits or in harmony with Anders v. 
California. If the Court desire- * furth^ repp'-r,?^  , our office 
wi 11 g 1 ad 1 y corru, 1 y up - request 
• r-l. n> IOARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Cr1mi na] Appeals Section 
DKS 
»o D. Berrett 
